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ABSTRACT
Since the Supreme Court’s decision to gut the Coverage Formula of the Voting Rights Act (VRA) in Shelby
County v. Holder, election lawyers and academics have searched for a different way to protect minority voters.
Many have turned to Section 2 of the VRA which prohibits intentional and effectual minority vote dilution. But
a small contingency at the Supreme Court has long argued—beginning with Justice Clarence Thomas’s
concurrence in Holder v. Hall—that Section 2 cannot be used to challenge the redistricting process. Although
Section 2 has withstood this opposition, there is a renewed concern that recent changes in the Supreme Court’s
composition is breathing new life into this debate and foreshadowing Section 2’s demise.
This Article explores that concern, and considers whether states are presently prepared to protect minority voting
rights without Section 2. First, it explains Section 2’s purpose and examines the merit of public concern regarding
Section 2. Next, this Article supposes—to borrow from baseball vernacular—that Section 2 is “going, gutted,
gone,” and thus creates four categories to represent how states presently protect minority voters. Then it considers
how the Court might do away with Section 2, and concludes that states are largely unprepared to be without
Section 2’s minority voter protection in the legislative redistricting context. Finally, this Article surveys the methods
used in states that have minority voter protections beyond what appear in Section 2 to offer as possible solutions
in jurisdictions that need additional minority voter protections.
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INTRODUCTION
Not so long ago, the United States government required certain states
and local jurisdictions to preclear any changes to election standards,
practices, and procedures.1 The Voting Rights Act of 1965 (“VRA”)2
granted the federal government this authority to address the country’s history
of minority voter discrimination.3 Section 5 of the VRA assigned the federal
government its preclearance authority,4 but this oversight was fueled by
Section 4(b)5 (the “Coverage Formula”) which designated the jurisdictions
subject to preclearance.6
The Coverage Formula was crucial to the federal government’s ability to
protect minority voters because it served as the instrument to bring each
jurisdiction under Section 5. Once subject to preclearance, the federal
government could ensure that no new election standards, practices, and
procedures had a retrogressive effect on minority voters’ ability to participate
in elections, and that no laws written with a discriminatory purpose could be
enacted.7 This system worked—the VRA was reauthorized various times
over the next forty years8 as the federal government processed thousands of
preclearance requests.9
But in 2009, the Supreme Court telegraphed the Coverage Formula’s
demise. In Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One vs. Holder, the
majority upheld Section 5 of the VRA but noted that it “impose[d]
substantial federalism costs” and “differentiate[d] between the States, despite
[the United States’] historic tradition that all the States enjoy ‘equal
sovereignty.’”10 The Court noted that blatantly discriminatory election
administration practices were a rarity compared to when the VRA was
1
2
3

4
5
6
7
8

9
10

Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, §§ 4–5, 79 Stat. 437, 438–39 (codified as amended
at 52 U.S.C. §§ 10303–10304 (2012)).
Id.
See Eric S. Lynch, Note, Trusting the Federalism Process Under Unique Circumstances: United States Election
Administration and Cybersecurity, 60 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1979, 1992–93 (2019) (outlining the
mechanics of VRA enforcement).
52 U.S.C. § 10304.
52 U.S.C. § 10303(b).
Id.
DANIEL P. TOKAJI, ELECTION LAW IN A NUTSHELL 104–08 (2d ed. 2017).
See Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 3, 96 Stat. 131, 134 (codified as
42 U.S.C. 1973b (2012)); Voting Rights Act of 1965, Amendments, Pub. L. 94-73, § 206, 89 Stat.
400, 402 (1975) (codified as 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973–1973d, 1973k (2012)); Voting Rights Act
Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. 91-285, § 2, 84 Stat. 314, 314–15.
See TOKAJI, supra note 7, at 28, 103.
Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 202–03 (2009) (quoting United
States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1, 16 (1960)).
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enacted, and thus questioned whether covered jurisdictions still required
federal oversight.11
Four years later, the Supreme Court finally gutted Section 5 in Shelby
County v. Holder.12 The Court found that the Coverage Formula was based
on “decades-old data and eradicated practices”—like the use of literacy tests
and poll taxes to discriminate against racial minority voters, and voter
registration and turnout data from the 1960s to the early 1970s—even
though circumstances had significantly improved.13 Since the “[Coverage
Formula]’s ‘current burdens’ [were not] justified by ‘current needs,’ and any
‘disparate geographic coverage’ [had to] be ‘sufficiently related to the
problem that it target[ed],’” the Court held that the Coverage Formula was
unconstitutional.14
Since Shelby County, election lawyers have debated how the VRA might
be redirected to continue serving as a robust protector of minority voters in
the democratic process, with an emphasis on Section 2 of the VRA.15 Section
2 prohibits intentional and effectual minority vote dilution.16 But a small
contingency within the Supreme Court has argued that Section 2 cannot be

11
12
13

14

15

16

See id. at 203.
Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013).
Id. at 551. The Court recognized that “such tests [had] been banned nationwide for over 40 years.
And voter registration and turnout numbers in the covered States [had] risen dramatically in the
years since.” Id. (citations omitted).
Id. at 551 (quoting Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 203 (2009)). The
Court notably left the door open to Congress instituting an updated formula, see id. at 557, but
Congress has yet to act on that option.
Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 2, 79 Stat. 437, 437 (codified as amended at 52
U.S.C. § 10301 (2012)); see, e.g., Dale E. Ho, Something Old, Something New, or Something Really Old?
Second Generation Racial Gerrymandering Litigation as Intentional Racial Discrimination Cases, 59 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1887 (2018) (arguing that Section 2 be used to bring more intent-based
discrimination claims); Daniel P. Tokaji, Applying Section 2 to the New Vote Denial, 50 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 439 (2015) (advocating a three-part test focusing on disparate impact to challenge voting
practices and procedures under Section 2); Jesus N. Joslin, Comment, Navigating the Post-Shelby
Landscape: Using Universalism to Augment the Remaining Power of the Voting Rights Act, 19 SCHOLAR 217
(2017) (advocating that states adopt practices and procedures that protect voting rights—like
automatic voter registration, online voting, and expanding early voting—rather than rely on the
VRA); Edward K. Olds, Note, More Than “Rarely Used”: A Post-Shelby Judicial Standard for Section 3
Preclearance, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 2185 (2017) (explaining how preclearance can be reanimated
through Section 3 of the VRA).
52 U.S.C. § 10301; see infra Part I.A (elaborating on Section 2’s scope and function). There are two
different kinds of claims under Section 2: vote denial and vote dilution. See Tokaji, supra note 15,
at 442. The former “concerns impediments to voting and the counting of votes,” and the latter
“implicate[s] the value of participation [, for example] being able to register, vote, and have one’s
vote counted.” Id. (emphasis in original). Since this Article focuses on redistricting, the analysis
exclusively considers Section 2 vote dilution claims.
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used to challenge the redistricting process.17 Section 2 has withstood this
opposition and continues to be an important tool to combat minority voter
suppression.18 But there is a renewed concern that recent changes in the
Supreme Court’s composition are breathing new life into this opposition and
foreshadow Section 2’s demise similar to how Northwest Austin signaled the
end of the Coverage Formula.19
This Article explores that concern, and considers whether states are
prepared to protect minority voting rights without Section 2. First, this
Article explains Section 2’s purpose and examines the merit of public
concern regarding Section 2.20 Next, it supposes that—to borrow from
baseball vernacular21—that Section 2 is “going, gutted, gone,” and thus
creates four categories to represent how states presently protect minority
voters.22 Then it considers how the Court might do away with Section 2,
and concludes that states are largely unprepared to be without Section 2’s
minority voter protection in the legislative redistricting context.23 Finally,
this Article surveys the methods used in states that have minority voter
protections beyond what appear in Section 2 to offer as possible solutions
in jurisdictions that need additional minority voter protections.24

17

18

19

20
21
22
23

24

See Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 892 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that the “size of a
governing body” is not within the terms of the Section 2); infra notes 522–666 and accompanying
text (considering Justice Thomas’s continuing opposition to race-conscious districting).
See, e.g., Jessica Cassella, Note, Using Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act to Fight Voter Suppression Tactics After
Shelby County v. Holder Without a New Section 4(b) Formula, 42 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 161 (2014)
(arguing that reframing Section 2 can replace a gutted Coverage Formula to challenge voter
suppression tactics).
See infra Part I.B. Although the circumstances are similar, the Coverage Formula and Section 2
differ in their legal application. Whereas the Coverage Formula’s minority voter protections only
applied to those covered jurisdictions, see Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 4, 79
Stat. 437, 438 (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 10303(b) (2012)), Section 2 protections extend
to every “State and political subdivision,” § 10301(a). Thus, the termination of Section 2 could
have even more widespread implications than the Coverage Formula.
See infra Part I.
Former Cincinnati Reds broadcaster Harry Hartman famously described homeruns as “Going,
Going, Gone!” GREG RHODES, CINCINNATI REDS HALL OF FAME HIGHLIGHTS 106 (2011).
See infra Part II.
See infra Part III. This Article focuses its analysis on state-legislative redistricting. Notably, this
means that this Article does not review or analyze any municipal, school district, county, or federalcongressional redistricting practices.
See infra Part IV. This Article concentrates on what states can do to further protect minority voters
through redistricting, but it recognizes that there are other means to protect the democratic process
besides the VRA. See, e.g., Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 786 n.7 (1983) (finding that
Ohio’s early petition filing deadline imposed on third-party candidates violated the First and
Fourteenth Amendments); Ben F.C. Wallace, Note, Charting Procedural Due Process and the Fundamental
Right to Vote, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 647 (2015) (examining procedural due process as a tool to protect
voting rights).
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I. EXPLAINING SECTION 2 AND ITS UNCERTAIN FUTURE
Section 2 began as an original VRA provision in 1965.25 This iteration
only prohibited election standards, practices, and procedures that intentionally
denied equal access to the political process.26 Although this may now seem
like an oversight, the drafters’ focus on intentional discrimination is best
understood by considering the rampant race-based voter intimidation that
preceded the VRA’s passage.27
Congress revised Section 2 several times over the years.28 The current
version now forbids both intentional and effectual voter discrimination:
(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or
procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision
in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any
citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color, or in
contravention of the guarantees set forth in section 4(f)(2) [52 USCS §
10303(f)(2)], as provided in subsection (b).
(b) A violation of subsection (a) is established if, based on the totality of
circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination
or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to
participation by members of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) in
that its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate
to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their
choice. The extent to which members of a protected class have been elected
to office in the State or political subdivision is one circumstance which may
be considered: Provided, That nothing in this section establishes a right to
have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their
proportion in the population.29

In short, Section 2 “prevent[s] the inequitable dilution of minority
communities’ voting power where alternative districts might otherwise allow
minorities to maintain an effective opportunity to elect candidates of

25
26

27
28

29

Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 2, 79 Stat. 437, 437 (codified as amended at 52
U.S.C. § 10301 (2012)).
See id. (“No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure shall
be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision to deny or abridge the right of any citizen
of the United States to vote on account of race or color.”) (emphasis added).
See Lynch, supra note 3, at 1984–94 (providing a history of African-American disenfranchisement
that led to the passage of the VRA).
See Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 3, 96 Stat. 131, 134 (codified as
42 U.S.C. 1973); Voting Rights Act of 1965, Amendments, Pub. L. 94-73, § 206, 89 Stat. 400, 402
(1975) (codified as 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973–1973d, 1973k (2012)); Voting Rights Act Amendments of
1970, Pub. L. 91-285, § 2, 84 Stat. 314, 314–15.
52 U.S.C. § 10301 (first emphasis added). Subsection (a) of this statute references a different statute
which specifically protects language minority voters. See 52 U.S.C. § 10303(f)(2) (2012) (“No voting
qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard practice, or procedure shall be
imposed . . . because [the citizen] is a member of a language minority group.”)
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choice.”30 This is a legal tool to prevent the cracking and packing
phenomenon,31 or “vote dilution” as a catch-all term.32
This Part both summarizes how courts analyze Section 2 claims, and why
voting rights advocates worry that it may not be around much longer.
A. Legal Analysis to Section 2 Claims
The Court explained how a plaintiff can use Section 2 to challenge a
districting scheme in Thornberg v. Gingles.33 A successful challenge relies on
the three Gingles conditions: compactness,34 political cohesion,35 and ability
to elect.36 Since its initial appearance, the Court has refined the Gingles
analysis in various cases to explain its many nuances.37
Ultimately, even if a plaintiff survives the Gingles analysis, the challenged
map may still comply with federal law. Under Section 2, a vote dilution
claim is also tested under the “totality of circumstances.”38 Gingles instructs
that courts may use the “Senate factors”39 to conduct this examination.40
30
31

32
33
34
35

36

37

38
39

40

Justin Levitt, Quick and Dirty: The New Misreading of the Voting Rights Act, 43 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 573,
586 (2016).
“Cracking” is when a minority voting group lives in one area but the redistricting process splits
them into several neighboring districts so as to decrease their ability to select a candidate of choice
in any of those districts. Lauren Payne-Riley, A Deeper Look at Gerrymandering, POLICYMAP:
MAPCHATS BLOG (Aug. 1, 2017), https://www.policymap.com/2017/08/a-deeper-look-atgerrymandering/. “Packing” is when map drawers concentrate a minority voting group into one
district to diminish their voting power in the surrounding districts. Id. The best way to understand
something is to do it. So, any reader that would like to learn more about packing and cracking
should
visit
USC
ANNENBERG
CTR.,
REDISTRICTING
GAME,
http://www.redistrictinggame.org/index.php (last visited July 25, 2020), for an excellent
interactive educational tool.
See supra note 16 (defining “vote dilution”).
See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50–51 (1986) (describing the Gingles conditions as a
“necessary preconditions” to establish a vote dilution claim).
See id. at 50 (“First, the minority group must be able to demonstrate that it is sufficiently large and
geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district.”).
See id. at 51 (“Second, the minority group must be able to show that it is politically cohesive. If the
minority group is not politically cohesive, it cannot be said that the selection of a multimember
electoral structure thwarts distinctive minority group interests.”).
See id. (“Third, the minority must be able to demonstrate that the white majority votes sufficiently
as a bloc to enable it—in the absence of special circumstances, such as the minority candidate
running unopposed . . .—usually to defeat the minority’s preferred candidate.”).
See TOKAJI, supra note 7, at 128–35, for a summary of the caselaw that defined vague terms like
“sufficiently large and geographically compact,” “politically cohesive,” and “totality of the
circumstances.”
52 U.S.C. § 10301(b) (2012).
The name derives from a Senate report that accompanied the Voting Rights Act Amendment of
1982. See S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 28–29 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 205–07
(enumerating the typical factors a plaintiff may show to establish a vote dilution violation).
Gingles, 478 U.S. at 44–45.
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The Senate factors include circumstances like the jurisdiction’s history of
race-based voting discrimination, whether campaigns in that jurisdiction
included overt or subtle appeals to racism, and the degree to which elected
officials had been unresponsive to the minority group’s concerns.41
If the Section 2 claim is successful, then the court enjoins the map and
compels the jurisdiction to redraw the lines42—possibly transforming the
jurisdiction into a “majority-minority district.”43 If the claim fails, then the
district remains as-is.44
B. Why Section 2 May Soon Be Gone
There are two reasons to believe that Section 2 may be on its last legs.
First, a series of Supreme Court opinions beginning with Holder v. Hall. And
second, recent changes in the Supreme Court's membership. To a degree,
these are two independent considerations, but Section 2’s longevity can be
reasonably questioned when studying what they mean together.
As suggested earlier, the series of Supreme Court opinions begins in 1994
with Holder v. Hall.45 In this case, the Court considered whether Section 2
applied to alterations in the form of government.46 A county in Georgia
planned to replace its commissioner—who performed all legislative and
executive functions—with a commission consisting of representatives from
five single-member districts and one chairperson elected at-large.47 Minority
voters contended that Section 2 required the new commission to be of a
sufficient size so that the County’s black voters—roughly 20% of the eligible
voting population—constituted a majority in at least one of the singlemember districts.48
The Court reviewed Plaintiffs’ Section 2 vote dilution claim and reasoned
that “a court must find a reasonable alternative practice as a benchmark

41
42
43

44
45
46
47
48

S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 28–29.
See, e.g., Gingles, 478 U.S. at 42, 80 (affirming the district court’s injunction of a redistricting plan).
“Majority-minority districts” are districts in which “a single racial or language minority constitutes
a majority of the population.” The Redistricting Glossary, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES,
http://www.ncsl.org/research/redistricting/the-redistricting-lexicon-glossary.aspx (last updated
Aug. 23, 2018).
See, e.g., Abbott v. Perez, 138 S. Ct. 2305, 2313–14 (2018) (finding that all but one of the legislative
districts reviewed were lawful).
Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 876 (1994) (plurality opinion).
Id. at 876. The appeal included Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment challenges, but the Court
remanded the case for consideration on these constitutional claims. Id. at 877, 885.
Id. at 876–77. For further discussion on single member districts and at-large schemes, see infra Part
IV.C.
Holder, 512 U.S at 876, 878.
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against which to measure the existing voting practice.”49 Plaintiffs tried to
establish a benchmark to compare against the County’s new municipal
governing structure, but the Court rejected the attempt and found that no
clear benchmark could be developed.50 Thus, the Court held that the new
form of government “[could not] be challenged as dilutive under [Section]
2.”51
Justice Clarence Thomas’s concurring opinion criticized the Court’s
Section 2 jurisprudence.52 He expressed discomfort with the Court
positioning itself to make political judgements on reapportionment,53
contempt for the assumption that all members of a minority group will vote
in the same way,54 and concern that permitting race-conscious line drawing
to create majority-minority districts would stoke racial tension.55
In the end, Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Antonin Scalia, agreed with
the Court’s judgment but disagreed with its reasoning.56 Justice Thomas
argued that challenging the size of a governing body is a non-starter under
Section 2 because it is not an election “standard, practice or procedure.”57
49

50

51
52

53

54

55

56
57

Id. at 880. The Court further reasoned that “[i]n order to decide whether an electoral system has
made it harder for minority voters to elect the candidates they prefer, a court must have an idea in
mind of how hard it should be for minority voters to elect their preferred candidates under an
acceptable system.” Id. (citing Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 88 (1986) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring in judgment)).
See id. at 881–82, 885 (rejecting Plaintiffs’ reasoning for setting the benchmark for comparison to a
hypothetical five-member commission and finding that Plaintiffs “provide[d] no acceptable
principles for deciding [benchmarks in] future cases”).
Id. at 881.
Id. at 891–92 (Thomas, J., concurring). For an in-depth analysis on Justice Thomas’s concurring
opinion in Holder, see Scott D. Gerber, Justice Clarence Thomas and the Jurisprudence of Race, 25 S.U. L.
REV. 43, 65–72 (1997).
Holder, 512 U.S. at 893–94 (“An examination of the current state of our decisions should make
obvious a simple fact that for far too long has gone unmentioned: Vote dilution cases have required
the federal courts to make decisions based on highly political judgments—judgments that courts
are inherently ill-equipped to make.”).
Id. at 904–06. On this point, Justice Thomas scolded the Court: “The assumptions upon which
our vote dilution decisions have been based should be repugnant to any nation that strives for the
ideal of a color-blind Constitution.” Id. at 905–06.
Id. at 906–07 (“As a practical political matter, our drive to segregate political districts by race can
only serve to deepen racial divisions by destroying any need for voters or candidates to build bridges
between racial groups or to form voting coalitions. ‘Black-preferred’ candidates are assured election
in ‘safe black districts’; white-preferred candidates are assured election in ‘safe white districts.’
Neither group needs to draw on support from the other’s constituency to win on election day.”).
Id. at 891.
See id. at 892 (“The broad reach we have given [Section 2] might suggest that the size of a governing
body, like an election method that has the potential for diluting the vote of a minority group, should
come within the terms of the Act. But the gloss we have placed on the words ‘standard, practice,
or procedure’ in cases alleging dilution is at odds with the terms of the statute and has proved utterly
unworkable in practice.”).
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To Justice Thomas, “an ‘effective’ vote [under the VRA] is merely one that
has been cast and fairly counted.”58 Thus, he proposed that Section 2 be
read only to review voting practices that affect minority citizens’ access to the
ballot box,59 and not to judge election-related procedures, such as “the
selection of one set of districting lines over another.”60
Since Holder v. Hall, Justice Thomas has continued to argue this point
during his tenure on the Court.61 He consistently opposes race-conscious
districting—whether to crack minority voter populations through
gerrymandering or pack minority voters into majority-minority districts—
and he opposes Section 2 being used as justification.62
Most recently, Justice Thomas revived this opinion in Abbott v. Perez where
the Court considered whether Texas’s state and federal districting maps
constituted vote dilution in violation of Section 2.63 The lower court held
that the State Legislature packed a large group of geographically compact
Hispanic voters into a series of neighboring districts such that they were a
minority in each instance, and thus could not elect their candidate of
choice.64 But the Supreme Court reversed, finding that the lower court
“disregarded the presumption of legislative good faith” and unfairly credited
Texas’s line drawers with racial intent.65 Justice Thomas filed a concurring
opinion reasserting his position that Section 2 should not apply to racial
gerrymandering claims.66

58
59

60

61

62

63
64
65

66

Id. at 919.
See id. at 922 (referring to “all manner of registration requirements, the practices surrounding
registration . . . , the locations of polling places, the times polls are open, the use of paper ballots as
opposed to voting machines, and other similar aspects of the voting process”).
Id. at 923 (referring also to “the choice of a multimember over a single-member districting system”
and “any other such electoral mechanism or method of election that might reduce the weight or
influence a ballot may have in controlling the outcome of an election”).
See, e.g., Ala. Legis. Black Caucus v. Alabama, 135 S. Ct. 1257, 1281 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(citing Holder, 512 U.S. at 907); Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 26 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring
in judgment) (citing Holder, 512 U.S. at 891); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 374 (2003)
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Holder, 512 U.S. at 899); Georgia v.
Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 492 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing Holder, 512 U.S. at 891).
See, e.g., Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1485–86 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing Holder,
512 U.S. at 922–23) (“[Section] 2 does not apply to redistricting and therefore cannot justify a racial
gerrymander.”).
Abbott v. Perez, 138 S. Ct. 2305 (2018).
Id. at 2318–19.
Id. at 2326–27. The Court effectively overturned this matter by focusing on the “totality of
circumstances” analysis. See supra notes 38–41 and accompanying text (discussing this part of the
Section 2 analysis).
Abbott, 138 S. Ct. at 2335 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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At first glance, Justice Thomas’s Perez concurrence may seem like his
same old routine,67 but it marks an important shift in the argument that he
had been making alone for nearly a quarter century. When newly appointed
Justice Neil Gorsuch joined the opinion, legal commentators condemned
him for breathing new life into Justice Thomas’s Holder concurrence.68 Soon
after, before he even had the chance to take part in oral arguments, some
speculated that Justice Brett Kavanaugh “[would] join with the court’s
conservative justices to further roll back [minority] voting rights protections
and other civil rights laws.”69 Should Justice Kavanaugh join Justices
Thomas and Gorsuch, the Perez concurrence may be the first in a series of
signals that the Court is ready to finally take down Section 2 similar to
Northwest Austin’s relationship to the Coverage Formula.70
But the serious concern amongst legal commentators is that the Court’s
recent shakeup positions Chief Justice John Roberts to serve as the Court’s
mystical swing vote.71 As noted earlier, the Court recently dealt a severe
blow to the VRA in Shelby County v. Holder.72 Commentators are quick to
point out that the Chief Justice authored that opinion, thus making him an
unlikely candidate to preserve minority voter protections.73 Commentators
67
68

69

70
71

72
73

See supra note 61 and accompanying text (providing examples of Justice Thomas’ commitment to
the argument that Section 2 does not apply to election-related procedures like gerrymandering).
See, e.g., Mark Joseph Stern, Neil Gorsuch Declares War on Voting Rights Act, SLATE (June 25, 2018, 11:54
AM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/06/abbott-v-perez-neil-gorsuch-says-the-votingrights-act-does-not-prohibit-racial-gerrymandering.html (describing Justice Gorsuch as a “fierce
opponent of the [VRA]”). Mark Joseph Stern, a Supreme Court and legal commentator, also noted
that Justice Gorsuch joined the Court’s 5-4 margin in two earlier Abbot-related procedural matters
when the Court blocked lower court rulings that would have required Texas to redraw both its
legislative and congressional district maps. Id. (citing Abbott v. Perez, No. 17A225, 2017 U.S.
LEXIS 4434, at *1 (U.S. Sept. 12, 2017); Abbott v. Perez, No. 17A245, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 4435, at
*1 (U.S. Sept. 12, 2017)). In summary, Stern described Justice Gorsuch’s short tenure on the Court
as “declar[ing] war on the VRA, inviting future challenges designed to sabotage the law’s ability to
guard against racial vote dilution” and proclaiming himself as “a staunch ally to lawmakers who
wish to suppress the votes of minority Americans.” Id.
Ari Berman, Opinion, Does Brett Kavanaugh Spell the End of Voting Rights?, N.Y. TIMES (July
13, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/13/opinion/sunday/voting-rights-voter-idkavanaugh.html. This fear is largely based on Justice Kavanaugh’s lower court opinion which
approved South Carolina’s voter identification statute against the federal government’s challenge.
See id. (referring to South Carolina v. United States, 898 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.C. Cir. 2012)).
See supra notes 10–14 and accompanying text (summarizing the gradual path the Court took in
finding the Coverage Formula unconstitutional).
See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Opinion, What the Supreme Court Could Look Like with John Roberts as its
Swing Vote, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2017, 4:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oehasen-roberts-swing-vote-20170410-story.html (considering the effect on the Court’s decisions if its
political makeup shifted such that Justice Roberts held the swing vote).
See supra notes 12–14 and accompanying text (explaining that the Court held that the Coverage
Formula was unconstitutional because the burdens it imposed were not justified by current needs).
Berman, supra note 69.
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also look skeptically on his experience prior to the bench—specifically a 1981
Justice Department memo wherein he argued that the federal government
should only exert Section 2 authority in intentional discrimination cases and
not effectual discrimination cases.74 As Professor Richard Hasen observed:
“[we] may have no choice but to put faith in [Chief Justice] Roberts” as the
swing vote, and “the possibility that [Chief Justice] Roberts’ restraint is the
best hope . . . shows us that [we] are in a truly poor position.”75
Considering Justice Thomas’s concurrence in Holder, and the recent shift
in the Court’s composition that placed Chief Justice Roberts at its ideological
center, there is reason to be concerned that Section 2’s minority voter
protections are “going, gutted, gone.”76
II. THE FOUR CATEGORIES OF MINORITY VOTER PROTECTION
The United States Constitution requires all states to follow federal law,77
and thus the states must comply with the VRA in their redistricting process.
However, should the Court decide that Section 2 does not apply to
redistricting,78 states will have to look elsewhere for additional minority voter
protections.79
This Part constructs four categories which represent how states presently
protect minority voters. All fifty states are sorted into these four categories
in the Appendix.80 The four categories are organized on a sliding scale from
those with the least to the most minority voter protections.
Category A includes states which offer no state law minority voter
protections. Although Category A states must comply with the Supremacy
Clause, it is strange that these states have not established any minority voter
protections in either their constitutions or statutory codes. These states all
instruct on basic redistricting principles such as allocating their designated
line drawer the authority to conduct reapportionment81 and establishing a
timetable to conduct reapportionment after the decennial census data is
74

75
76
77
78
79
80
81

Id.; see also Ari Berman, Inside John Roberts’ Decades-Long Crusade Against the Voting Rights Act, POLITICO
MAG. (Aug. 10, 2015), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/08/john-roberts-votingrights-act-121222 (detailing Chief Justice Roberts' history on voting rights issues throughout his
career).
Hasen, supra note 71.
RHODES, supra note 21.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
See infra Part III, which imagines how the Court might dispose of Section 2.
See supra note 24 (explaining that there remain constitutional provisions to protect minority voters,
but they are outside the scope of this Article).
See supra note 23 (explaining this analysis’s limitations).
See, e.g., GA. CONST. art. III, § 2, ¶ II (requiring that the State Legislature conduct reapportionment).
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reported.82 But these states fail to make any mention of minority voter
protections even though the United States has a long history of minority
voter discrimination.83 Notably, Category A includes seven of the nine states
that came under the Coverage Formula at the time of the Shelby County
decision, and one state wherein forty counties were subject to federal
oversight.84 Thus, these states have earned their unique designation.
Categories B and C share only a slight difference, and thus they will be
discussed together throughout this Article. Category B represents those
states that only make references to the VRA to protect minority voters in
their constitutional or statutory language, whereas Category C includes states
that have reproduced Section 2’s language in their own state law.85
At this time, in a world where Section 2 is operational, Categories B and
C function no differently than Category A. Therefore, their main distinction
from Category A is that these jurisdictions at least have something in their
constitutions or statutory codes that demonstrate an intent to protect
minority voters. In the context of this Article, this distinction is most
important when discussing how jurisdictions might be affected if the Court
decides that discriminatory redistricting claims are no longer a colorable
claim under Section 2 in federal courts.86
Finally, Category D consists of those states that have additional measures
to protect minority voters. These states, like those in Categories B and C,
may point directly to the VRA or use language that appears in Section 2.87
82

83
84

85

86
87

See, e.g., MISS. CONST. art. 13, § 254 (mandating that the State Legislature begin redistricting after
the decennial census, and calling upon a backup commission to draw the map if the State
Legislature cannot successfully complete the process within a specific time frame).
See supra note 27 and accompanying text (providing a history of minority disenfranchisement).
Jurisdictions
Previously
Covered
by
Section
5,
U.S.
DEP’T
JUSTICE,
https://www.justice.gov/crt/jurisdictions-previously-covered-section-5 (last updated Aug. 6,
2015).
Compare MONT. CODE ANN. § 5-1-115(2) (2019) (“In the development of legislative districts, a plan
is subject to the Voting Rights Act. . . .”), with MD. CODE ANN., ELEC. LAW § 16-201(a)(7) (Lexis
Nexis 2020) (“A person may not willfully and knowingly . . . engage in conduct that results or has
the intent to result in the denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to
vote on account of race, color, or disability.”). One quirky exception that fits into Category B is
Wisconsin. Although Wisconsin does not dedicate constitutional or statutory language that directly
points its line drawers to follow the VRA, the state’s statutory code allows citizens to file petitions
with the State’s Attorney General that allege the redistricting process did not comply with Section
2. WIS. STAT. § 5.081 (2020). The State’s Attorney General then has the discretionary authority
to commence legal action in any relevant court. Id.
See infra Part IV.B.
See, e.g., N.Y. CONST. art. III, § 4(c)(1) (“When drawing district lines, the commission shall consider
whether such lines would result in the denial or abridgement of racial or language minority voting
rights, and districts shall not be drawn to have the purpose of, nor shall they result in, the denial or
abridgement of such rights.”).
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But these states differ in that they have constructed their own defenses to
protect minority voters. For example, some states prioritize drawing districts
with minority representation,88 while others explicitly prohibit drawing
districts with “the purpose of diluting the voting strength of any language or
ethnic minority group.”89
In total, there are twenty-nine states in Category A, eight in Category B,
four in Category C, and nine in Category D.90
III. HOW THE COURT COULD ELIMINATE SECTION 2
Since there is reason to believe that the Court may set aside Section 2’s
minority voter protections,91 this Part explores how the Court could
accomplish this task. Furthermore, this Part uses the aforementioned
Categories92 to explore how the Court’s reasoning would affect the
remaining minority voter protections across the country.
A. Scenario 1: Section 2 is Unconstitutionally Applied to Redistricting
In this scenario, the Court follows Justice Clarence Thomas’s concurring
opinion in Holder v. Hall and holds that reapportionment is not a “standard,
practice, or procedure” under Section 2.93 Thus, minority voters could not

88
89

90
91
92
93

See, e.g., 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 120/5-5(a) (LexisNexis 2019) (“[D]istricts shall be drawn . . . to
create crossover districts, coalition districts, or influence districts.”).
See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 188.010(3) (2019); cf., COLO. CONST. art. V, § 48.1(4)(b) (“No map may
be approved . . . if . . . drawn for the purpose of or results in the denial or abridgement of the right
of any citizen to vote . . . including diluting the impact of that racial or language minority group’s
electoral influence.”); FLA. CONST. art. III, § 21(a) (“[D]istricts shall not be drawn with the intent
or result of denying or abridging the equal opportunity of racial or language minorities to
participate in the political process or to diminish their ability to elect representatives of their
choice. . . .”); CAL. ELEC. CODE § 14027 (Deering 2020) (“An at-large method of election may
not . . . impair[] the ability of a protected class to elect candidates of its choice . . . as a result of the
dilution or the abridgement of the rights of voters . . . .”); IOWA CODE § 42.4(5) (2019) (“No district
shall be drawn . . . for the purpose of augmenting or diluting the voting strength of a language or
racial minority group.”); WASH. REV. CODE § 29A.92.030(1) (2019) (finding a violation when
“elections in the political subdivision exhibit polarized voting” and “members of a protected
class . . . do not have an equal opportunity elect candidates of their choice as a result of the dilution
or abridgement of the rights of members of that protected class”).
See infra Appendix.
See supra Part I.B. (suggesting grounds such as the shift in the Court’s composition and growing
support for the position that Section 2 should not apply to racial gerrymandering claims).
See supra Part II (explaining the different approaches that states take in protecting minority voters in
the redistricting process).
Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 892 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring). See supra notes 45–60 and
accompanying text for more details on the Court’s opinion in Holder v. Hall, and Justice Thomas’s
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use Section 2 to challenge discriminatory intent or effect in the redistricting
context, nor would they be able to rely on language that references or tracks
Section 2 to make those challenges in state courts.94
Categories A, B, and C are most affected in this scenario because they
rely on federal jurisprudence in applying Section 2 to redistricting claims.
Category A jurisdictions already rely solely on Section 2 through the
Supremacy Clause because neither their constitutional or statutory language
make reference to federal minority voter protections, nor do they establish
their own protections.95 Category B similarly relies solely on Section 2
because these jurisdictions simply point to federal law as controlling in this
matter.96 Since Category C jurisdictions have their own constitutional and
statutory language dedicated to protecting minority voters,97 any jurisdiction
with language accompanied by its own jurisprudence would survive this scenario. But
at this time, none of the minority voter protections in Category C
jurisdictions fit this description, and thus they would all suffer the same fate
as Category A and B jurisdictions.
Under this ruling, Category D jurisdictions still have some defenses to
challenge effectual discrimination because they offer additional minority
voters protections beyond what appears in Section 2.98 Furthermore, like
Category C, any jurisdiction with protections that use language that tracks
with Section 2 and is accompanied by its own jurisprudence would survive
this scenario.99 But those jurisdictions that include these provisions and
simply follow federal jurisprudence would be struck down like Categories A,

94

95
96
97
98
99

concurrence. This Article does not consider a scenario where Section 2 is found unconstitutional
because that possibility is inconceivable at this time. See Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529,
537, 557 (2013) (“Section 2 is permanent, applies nationwide, and is not at issue in this case. . . .
Our decision in no way affects the permanent, nationwide ban on racial discrimination in voting
found in [Section] 2”); Holder, 512 U.S. at 893 (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that Section 2 does
“reach . . . state enactments that limit citizens’ access to the ballot”).
Recall that no matter what the Court may do to Section 2, there are still constitutional backstops
that plaintiffs may use to challenge redistricting schemes. See supra note 24 (noting other means such
as the First and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as procedural due process).
See supra notes 81–84 and accompanying text.
See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 85–86 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 87–89 and accompanying text. For a detailed description of the additional
protections in each Category D jurisdiction, see infra Appendix.
For example, California’s statutory code uses language that mirrors what appears in Section 2.
Compare 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (2012), with CAL. ELEC. CODE § 14027 (Deering 2020). But California’s
statute would survive a facial challenge under this scenario because its courts have deciphered its
meaning in a way that makes it distinctive from Section 2. See, e.g., Rey v. Madera Unified Sch.
Dist., 138 Cal. Rptr. 3d 192, 201 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012) (finding that “the [California] Legislature’s
use of the phrase ‘imposed or applied’ indicates that . . . violating Elections Code section 14027 is
premised on the party having taken some sort of affirmative action with respect to the election.”).
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B, and C.100 Thus, Category D encompasses the only jurisdictions that
currently have minority voter protections at the state-level which could
survive this scenario.
B. Scenario 2: Federal Minority Voters Protections are Gutted
In Holder v. Hall, Justice Thomas argues that Congress did not appoint
the Justices to be “mighty Platonic guardians . . . [who] determine the best
form of local government for every county, city, village, and town in
America.”101 Instead, Congress granted the Court limited authority, so “[the
Court] should be cautious in interpreting any Act of Congress to grant [it]
power to make such determinations.”102
Under that reasoning, in this scenario, the Court holds that
discriminatory redistricting challenges can no longer be brought into federal
courts under Section 2. This is a more limited approach than discussed in
Scenario 1. Although Scenario 2 would still have the same effect on
Categories A and B because those jurisdictions solely rely on the VRA in
these matters,103 this limited holding would permit Category C and D
jurisdictions to continue reviewing discriminatory reapportionment claims
under their respective constitutional and statutory language.104 Notably,
unlike in Scenario 1,105 Category C and D jurisdictions that have state laws
that track Section 2 language survive this scenario whether or not the
language is accompanied by its own jurisprudence at the time of the Court’s
decision because the Court’s holding is limited to federal courts.
C. Commentary on Scenarios 1 and 2
Scenario 2 is the more likely outcome for two reasons. First, due to the
recent shift in the Court’s composition,106 many commentators have
speculated about public confidence in a politicized Supreme Court.107
100
101
102
103
104

105
106
107

See supra notes 94–97 and accompanying text.
Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 913 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring).
Id.
See supra notes 95–96 and accompanying text.
Regardless of what happened in the Category D jurisdictions, they would retain their additional
minority voter protections on redistricting matters like in Scenario 1. See supra note 98 and
accompanying text.
See supra notes 97–100 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 68–69 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Lawrence Baum & Neal Devins, Opinion, The Hidden Silver Lining if Kavanaugh is Confirmed,
WASH. POST (Oct. 5, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-hidden-silver-liningif-kavanaugh-is-confirmed/2018/10/05/fc2d7fb6-c8ce-11e8-b2b5-79270f9cce17_story.html?ut
m_term=.903e731a38c5.
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Although Chief Justice Roberts’ position on voting rights has garnered
significant speculation,108 Supreme Court commentators have also argued
that the Chief Justice is particularly conscious about the Court’s legacy under
his leadership.109 Thus, if the Court were to limit Section 2’s application, he
may look for a way to limit the effect.
Second, and more importantly, Justice Thomas’s aggressive approach
has not gained traction over the years. Although Chief Justice Roberts and
Justice Samuel Alito were not on the Court at the time of Holder v. Hall, they
have both passed on numerous opportunities to join Justice Thomas’s
position.110
Notably, Scenario 2 shares a key characteristic with the Court’s Shelby
County decision: the Court would gut Section 2 for vagueness while inviting
Congress to pass further legislation111 that clarifies whether reapportionment
is an election “standard, practice, or procedure.” This may not be Justice
Thomas’s most desired outcome, but it would stop all Section 2 redistricting
claims from ever reaching his desk again.
IV. WHAT STATES CAN DO TO PREVENT MINORITY VOTER
DISCRIMINATION
As demonstrated in Part III, many states are unprepared to protect
minority voters' rights in the event that the Supreme Court either guts or
strikes down Section 2 of the VRA. This Part offers proactive remedies to
this problem. It follows a path already suggested by many legal
commentators: return to the “test tubes of democracy” to “normalize
election practices.”112 This Part reviews the different mechanisms used
across the country—and the legal challenges to those efforts—to outline what
108
109

110

111
112

See supra notes 73–74 and accompanying text.
E.g., Baum & Devins, supra note 107 (arguing that Chief Justice Roberts may steer the Court to
limited decisions because the political turmoil surrounding how the Court’s ideology shifted
exacerbates his unique role as the Court’s institutional leader who must “maintain[] the court’s
standing by fostering its esteem among the general public”).
See, e.g., Abbott v. Perez, 138 S. Ct. 2305, 2312–13 (2018) (Alito, J., filing the Court’s opinion)
(Roberts, C.J., joining); Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1486 (2017) (Alito, J., concurring in
judgment in part and dissenting in part) (Roberts, C.J., joining); Ala. Legis. Black Caucus v.
Alabama, 135 S. Ct. 1257, 1274 (2015) (Scalia, J. dissenting) (Roberts, C.J., and Alito, J., joining);
Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 532–34 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., filing the Court’s opinion)
(Alito, J., joining); Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 5 (2009) (Kennedy, J., filing the Court’s
opinion) (Roberts, C.J., and Alito, J., joining).
See Shelby County, 570 U.S. at 557 (“Congress may draft another formula based on current
conditions.”).
Joshua A. Douglas, Opinion, To Safeguard Voting Rights, Go Local, CNN (Feb. 17, 2017, 2:58 PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2017/02/17/opinions/improve-voting-local-level-douglas/index.html.
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practices states can implement to secure minority voter protections in their
own jurisdictions.113
A. State Constitutional Hook
The most obvious way to protect minority voters is to return to the basics:
the fundamental right to vote. When litigants rely on federal claims to
protect voting rights, they point towards “‘negative’ rights, or prohibitions
on governmental action, as opposed to specifically stated grants of individual
liberties.”114 The federal constitution mentions the right to vote seven times,
but never actually grants the right to vote.115 Meanwhile, forty-nine states
explicitly grant the right to vote,116 and the fiftieth state (Arizona) implicitly
confers this right.117
Since the fundamental right to vote is grounded in each states’
constitution, states can look to these foundational documents to protect
minority voters in the districting process. Most notably, twenty-six state
constitutions mandate that elections be “free,” “free and equal,” or “free and
open.”118 States could look to these provisions to protect minority voters
because plaintiffs recently succeeded in using Pennsylvania’s Free and Equal
Clause119 to strike down a statewide partisan gerrymander.
In League of Women Voters v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania concluded that the Commonwealth’s districting scheme
diluted Democrats’ votes to the extent that “all voters [did] not have an equal
opportunity to translate their votes into representation.”120 The Court
recognized its broad interpretation, but reasoned that this expansive scope
“guard[ed] against the risk of unfairly rendering votes nugatory, artificially
entrenching representative power, and discouraging voters from

113

114
115
116
117
118
119
120

No jurisdiction is perfect—even those in Category D could do more to ensure that minority voters
are protected. This Part is not intended to scold those states in Categories A, B, and C. Instead,
this Part aims to offer every jurisdiction a panoply of options for further action.
Joshua A. Douglas, The Right to Vote Under State Constitutions, 67 VAND. L. REV. 89, 95 (2014) (citations
omitted).
Id. at 96–97 (referring to Article I, § 2, and the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Seventeenth, Nineteenth,
Twenty-Fourth, and Twenty-Sixth Amendments).
Id. at 101.
Id. at 102. (“[S]tating that ‘no person shall be entitled to vote . . . unless’ the person meets the
citizenship, residency, and age requirements.”) (citing ARIZ. CONST. art. VII, § 2).
Id. at 103.
PA. CONST. art. I, § 5 (“Elections shall be free and equal; and no power, civil or military, shall at
any time interfere to prevent the free exercise of the right of suffrage.”).
League of Women Voters v. Commonwealth, 178 A.3d 737, 814 (Pa. 2018), cert. denied, Turzai v.
Brandt, 139 S. Ct. 445 (2018).

August 2020]

GOING, GUTTED, GONE

1459

participating in the electoral process because they have come to believe that
the power of their individual vote . . . ‘does not count.’”121
Although League of Women Voters reviewed a partisan gerrymander, a court
may apply the same principle when assessing racial or ethnic minority vote
dilution. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania found that vote dilution was
“the antithesis of a healthy representative democracy. . . . because each and
every Pennsylvania voter must have the same free and equal opportunity to
select his or her representatives.”122 Thus, the Court did not find that the
Free and Equal Clause ensures Democrats and Republicans have the same free
and equal opportunity to select their representatives—it found that all voters
have the same free and equal opportunity to select their representatives. No
matter what group the voters belong to, the Court held that vote dilution
contravened the Commonwealth’s Free and Equal Clause.
Besides Fair and Equal Clauses, three state constitutions require
“competitive” districts.123 So far, only Arizona’s Competitiveness Clause has
received judicial attention, but the state’s Supreme Court merely clarified the
provision rather than reviewed it on the merits.124 Since these state
constitutional provisions were not designed—or yet been proven—to protect
minority voters, they cannot be used to bring these jurisdictions into
Category D.125
Nevertheless, litigants should consider pursuing these state constitutional
claims because they can avoid messy federal election law jurisprudence and
favorable decisions are unlikely to merit federal review.126

121
122
123

124
125
126

Id.
Id. (emphasis in original).
ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 1(14)(F) (“To the extent practicable, competitive districts should be
favored where to do so would create no significant detriment to the other goals.”); COLO. CONST.
art. V, § 46(1)(c) (“The redistricting commission should set district lines by ensuring constitutionally
guaranteed voting rights, including the protection of minority group voting, as well as fair and
effective representation of constituents using politically neutral criteria.”); MO. CONST. art. III, §
3(c)(1)(b) (“Districts shall be designed in a manner that achieves both partisan fairness and,
secondarily, competitiveness.”). Notably, the state of Washington also requires “competitive”
districts, but through the state’s statutory code. WASH. REV. CODE § 44.05.090(5) (2018) (“The
commission shall exercise its powers to provide fair and effective representation and to encourage
electoral competition.”).
Ariz. Minority Coal. for Fair Redistricting v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 208 P.3d 676,
686 (Ariz. 2009).
See infra Appendix.
See Charlie Stewart, State Court Litigation: The New Front in the War Against Partisan Gerrymandering, 116
MICH. L. REV. ONLINE 152, 159 (2018) (noting that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s holding
that “a claim under the Pennsylvania Constitution’s free and clear elections clause should be
adjudicated” differently than under the federal equal protection clause “insulated [it] from Supreme
Court Review”).
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B. Mini-VRAs
States can further defend historically disenfranchised minority groups by
enacting their own “mini-VRAs.” So far, there is little academic writing on
the topic. But those scholars discussing mini-VRAs view them as offering
substantive and procedural benefits to minority voters and the legal system,
as well as forecasting a future where states “legislate[] without federal
oversight.”127
The California Voting Rights Act of 2001 (CVRA)128 was the first miniVRA.129 It targets “racially polarized voting”130 by allowing minority voters
to challenge at-large election schemes in state courts.131 A violation of the
CVRA occurs when “it is shown that racially polarized voting occurs in
elections for members of the governing body of the political subdivision or in
elections incorporating other electoral choices by the voters of the political
subdivision.”132 The CVRA builds on the federal statute to provide plaintiffs
an easier opportunity to challenge at-large election schemes.133 But unlike
the federal statute, the CVRA allows plaintiffs to establish a successful
discrimination challenge without having to prove geographical compactness

127
128
129
130

131

132

133

E.g., Kareem U. Crayton, Reinventing Voting Rights Preclearance, 44 IND. L. REV. 201, 239–41 (2010).
California Voting Rights Act of 2001, ch. 129, 2002 Cal. Stat. 703 (codified as amended at CAL.
ELEC. CODE §§ 14025–14032 (West 2020)).
Crayton, supra note 127, at 239.
ELEC. § 14026 (defining “racially polarized voting” as “voting in which there is a difference . . . in
the choice of candidates or other electoral choices that are preferred by voters in a protected class,
and in the choice of candidates and electoral choices that are preferred by voters in the rest of the
electorate”).
See ELEC. § 14027 (“An at-large method of election may not be imposed or applied in a manner
that impairs the ability of a protected class to elect candidates of its choice or its ability to influence
the outcome of an election, as a result of the dilution or the abridgment of the rights of voters who
are members of a protected class . . . .”).
ELEC. § 14028(a). “The occurrence of racially polarized voting shall be determined from examining
results of elections in which at least one candidate is a member of a protected class or elections
involving ballot measures, or other electoral choices that affect the rights and privileges of members
of a protected class.” Id. ELEC. § 14028(b).
See supra note 34 and accompanying text (explaining that geographical compactness is a necessary
factor to establish a Section 2 claim).
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or concentration.134 The drawback is that the CVRA only applies to at-large
election schemes.135
The CVRA has already survived multiple Equal Protection challenges.
First, the California Court of Appeals held that the CVRA was race-neutral
because it did not favor one race over another, nor benefit or burden a
litigant based on race.136 More recently, a California District Court
dismissed a similar claim for lack of evidence that the litigant’s district, as
drawn under the CVRA, classified the litigant into his district based on race,
and the Ninth Circuit affirmed.137
A mini-VRA out of Illinois takes a different approach. The Illinois
Voting Rights Act of 2011 (“IVRA”)138 instead tries to limit large minority
voter populations from being fractured in the redistricting process. The
IVRA instructs line drawers “to create crossover districts, coalition districts,
or influence districts” when possible to benefit “racial minorit[ies] [and]
language minorit[ies].”139 The IVRA specifically defines “racial minorities
or language minorities” as the “same class of voters who are members of a
race, color, or language minority group receiving protection under the
federal [VRA].”140
The IVRA also survived its own constitutional challenge. Plaintiffs
argued that the IVRA violated the Equal Protection Clause because it
elevated race to be the predominant factor in redistricting.141 But the
Northern District Court of Illinois found that the IVRA survived this

134

135

136
137
138
139
140
141

See ELEC. § 14028(c) (“The fact that members of a protected class are not geographically compact
or concentrated may not preclude a finding of racially polarized voting . . . .”). Notably, plaintiffs
may use compactness to demonstrate vote dilution, but it is not required. See ELEC. § 14028(c), (e)
(listing "voting practices or procedures that may enhance the dilutive effects of at-large elections”
as among “probative, but not necessary factors” to establish a successful claim”).
See Joaquin G. Avila et al., Voting Rights in California: 1982–2006, 17 REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 131, 152
(2007) (noting that the CVRA “does not apply to other methods of elections, redistrictings or other
voting changes”). See also Joanna E. Cuevas Ingram, The Color of Change: Voting Rights in the 21st
Century and the California Voting Rights Act, 15 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 183, 192–96 (2012) for a more
in-depth comparison between the CVRA and Section 2.
Sanchez v. City of Modesto, 51 Cal. Rptr. 3d 821, 843 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006).
Higginson v. Becerra, 363 F. Supp. 3d 1118, 1127–28 (S.D. Cal. 2019), aff’d, 786 F. App’x 705
(Mem.) (9th Cir. 2019).
Illinois Voting Rights Act of 2011, Pub. Act No. 96-1541, 2010 Ill. Laws 7774 (codified at 10 ILL.
COMP. STAT. §§ 120/5-1–5-5).
§ 120/5-5(a)–(b). For further clarification, the state of Illinois defines these terms for the line drawer.
Id. § 120/5-5(b).
§ 120/5-5(c).
Radogno v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections, No. 1:11-cv-04884, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122053, at *24–
25 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 21, 2011).
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challenge because it clearly states that any use of race in line drawing must
be subservient to federal and Illinois constitutional law.142
Although the mini-VRA is a new and relatively untested concept, they
have so far survived constitutional challenges to address specific minority
voter problems in their respective jurisdictions.
Unlike the state
constitutional hooks discussed at length in Part IV.A, mini-VRAs do shift
states into Category D because they are established for the purpose of
protecting minority voters in the redistricting process.143
C. Multimember Districts
Multimember districts (“MMDs”) are probably the most agreed upon
way to remedy minority vote dilution. MMDs are “electoral districts that
send two or more members to a legislative chamber.”144 The concept is best
understood in contrast to its counterparts: single-member districts
(“SMDs”)—districts that elect only one representative to the legislature145—
and at-large districts—districts that extend over the entire political
subdivision and elect either one or several candidates.146
SMDs are not inherent to the Constitution’s structure, nor United States’
history,147 yet SMDs are the norm among states. Ten state legislatures
presently have at least one legislative chamber with MMDs,148 but many
states limit the practice to some degree. At least six states outright require
SMDs.149 Meanwhile, some states only require SMDs in the State Senate,150
and others only require SMDs in the State House or Assembly.151 Hawaii
and New Jersey are anomalies. Hawaii allows MMDs, but limits them to
142
143
144

145
146
147

148

149
150
151

Id. at *25–26 (citing § 120/5-5(a), (d)).
See infra Appendix.
State
Legislative
Chambers
that
Use
Multi-Member
Districts,
BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/State_legislative_chambers_that_use_multi-member_districts (last visited
July 25, 2020) [hereinafter MMDs Explained].
The Redistricting Glossary, supra note 43.
Id. Presently, at-large districts are only used by states which are allotted one representative in the
House of Representatives. MMDs Explained, supra note 144.
See Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 897–98 (1994) (Thomas, J. concurring) (finding “no principle
inherent” in the Constitution that makes SMDs the “‘proper’ mechanism for electing
representatives" and noting that “[i]t was not until 1842 that Congress determined that
Representatives should be elected from [SMDs]”).
MMDs Explained, supra note 144 (citing Arizona, Idaho, Maryland, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
North Dakota, South Dakota, Vermont, Washington, and West Virginia as having MMDs in their
respective state legislatures).
See ALASKA CONST. art. VI, § 4; CONN. CONST. art. III, §§ 3-4; KAN. CONST. art. II, § 2; LA.
CONST. art. III, § 1; MD. CONST. art. III, § 3; ME. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 2.
E.g., ALA. CONST. art. IX, § 200; MASS. CONST. amend. art. CI, § 2; N.H. CONST. pt. II, art. 26.
E.g., N.Y. CONST. art. III, § 5.
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four representatives per district.152
New Jersey requires that two
representatives are elected from each district.153
Critics highlight the winner-take-all format as the inherent problem with
SMDs because it leads to—among other things—low representation for
racial minorities.154 In contrast, MMDs offer racial minorities an
opportunity to regularly elect a candidate of choice without being packed
into majority-minority districts. For example, one study of Louisiana at the
federal level found that SMDs created one minority-preferred candidate
alongside five other safely held seats in the state, but MMDs would create
two minority-preferred candidates, two safely held seats, and two moderate
representatives.155 But MMDs accomplish more than just increased minority
representation in the state legislature—they place every voter, regardless of
race, in the position to elect a candidate of choice.156
Even Justice Clarence Thomas recognized the benefits of MMDs in his
Holder v. Hall concurrence. He described non-winner-take-all systems as
“voting mechanisms . . . that can produce proportional results without
requiring division of the electorate into racially segregated districts.”157 If
Justice Thomas points to a way to solve the underlying issues that keep
plaguing the Court—and him—with Section 2 claims, then it serves states as
a strong indicator to where they may find a suitable mechanism to protect
minority voters.
It is important to note here that MMDs do not factor into this Article’s
categorization of jurisdictions.158 Although MMDs have been demonstrated
to benefit minority voters in the redistricting process to access political
representation,159 they do not factor into this part of the analysis because they
are not a tool to seek legal remedy. Instead, jurisdictions should view MMDs
as a means to avoid litigation entirely.

152
153
154

155
156
157
158
159

HAW. CONST. art. IV, § 6(7).
N.J. CONST. art. IV, § II, ¶ 4.
E.g., Rob Richie & Andrew Spencer, The Right Choice for Elections: How Choice Voting Will End
Gerrymandering and Expand Minority Voting Rights, From City Councils to Congress, 47 U. RICH. L. REV.
959, 960 (2013).
Id. at 1004–05 (citing 2011 Redistricting and 2012 Elections in Louisiana, FAIRVOTE (Sept. 2012),
http://www.fairvote.org/assets/2012-Redistricting/).
Id. at 1006.
Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 909–10 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring).
See infra Appendix.
See supra notes 154–56156 and accompanying text.
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D. Independent Redistricting Commissions
States may also consider implementing independent redistricting
commissions (“IRCs”) to protect minority voting communities. IRCs are
groups of citizens that a state authorizes to conduct the redistricting
process.160 IRCs recently faced a constitutional challenge, but the Supreme
Court upheld the voters’ ability to reassign redistricting authority from the
state legislature to an independent group.161 Six states will use IRCs in the
2021–2022 redistricting cycle.162
There are various rules to ensure that politics stay out of IRCs. For
example, elected and public officials are ineligible to become members of
IRCs, and some states even bar legislative staff and lobbyists from
participation.163 Furthermore, once a citizen becomes a member of an IRC,
there can be certain restrictions placed on them such as becoming ineligible
to run for elected office in the districts that they draw or a ban on becoming
a registered lobbyist for a period in the future.164
But IRC rules do not solely address partisanship redistricting concerns—
they also extend to minority voter protections. For example, Arizona directs
its IRC to draw district boundaries that “respect communities of interest to
the extent practicable.”165 Michigan has a similar “communities of interest”
directive, but clarifies that “communities of interest” includes “populations
that share cultural or historical characteristics or economic interests . . .
[and] not . . . relationships with political parties, incumbents, or political

160

161

162

163

164
165

See
Justin
Levitt,
Who
Draws
the
Lines?,
ALL
ABOUT
REDISTRICTING,
http://redistricting.lls.edu/who.php (last visited July 25, 2020) (describing the various groups, such
as an IRC, that draw district lines across different states) .
Ariz. State Legis. v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2658–59, 2677 (2015).
For further review on this case, and information on IRCs generally, see Barry Edwards et al., Can
Independent Redistricting Commissions Lead Us Out of the Political Thicket?, 9 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 288
(2016).
See ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 1(3); CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 1; COLO. CONST. art. V, § 46(2);
MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 6; N.Y. CONST. art. III, § 4; UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-20-201 (West
2020).
See ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2 § 1(3); CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2(c); COLO. CONST. art. V, §
47(2)(c); MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 6(1)(b); N.Y. CONST. art. III, § 5-b(b); UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A19-201(6) (West 2020).
See ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2 § 1(3); CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2(c); MICH. CONST. art. IV, §
6(1)(e).
ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2 § 1(14)(D); see also N.Y. CONST. art. III, § 4(c)(5) (directing IRC to
“consider the maintenance . . . of pre-existing political subdivisions, including . . . communities of
interest”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-20-302(5)(a) (West 2020) (making “preserving communities of
interest” a redistricting priority).
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candidates.”166 New York and Colorado go the furthest by requiring that
the IRC’s composition “reflect” their respective populations.167 This all but
ensures that minority voters will sit on the IRC and have a voice in the
redistricting process.
Some scholars argue that, in practice, IRCs are “inconsequential for
communities of color” because IRCs “fail[] . . . to enhance minority
representation.”168 Others argue that IRCs simply shift the “significant social
and political pressures to produce a set of district lines that is fair to all
relevant interest groups, including those that define themselves by race” from
the legislature to citizens,169 and some assert that “partisan redistricting
aimed at protecting incumbents . . . results in a preferred legislative
product.”170 But IRCs are such a relatively new tool in the districting
process, and thus such a small sample size cannot yet yield a definitive
conclusion. Thus, the fact that a jurisdiction has an IRC does not factor into
this Article’s categorization of jurisdictions unless the statute expressly states
an intention to protect minority voters.171 Even though there is little data on
IRCs at this time, states should still be encouraged to implement IRCs in a
way that directs line drawers away from vote dilution through built-in
minority voter protections.
CONCLUSION
The combination of Justice Thomas’s continued opposition to Section 2
in the redistricting context and the change in the Court’s ideological
composition has led to the concern that Section 2 may be “going, gutted,

166

167

168
169
170
171

MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 6(13)(c); see also COLO. CONST. art. V, § 46(3)(b)(I) (defining community
of interest as “any group in Colorado that shares one or more substantial interests that may be the
subject of state legislative action, is composed of a reasonably proximate population, and thus
should be considered for inclusion within a single district for purposes of ensuring its fair and
effective representation”).
See COLO. CONST. art. V, § 47(10)(a) (“To the extent possible, ensure that the [IRC] reflects
Colorado’s racial, ethnic, gender, and geographic diversity.”); N.Y. CONST. art. III, § 5-b(c) (“To
the extent practicable, the members of the [IRC] shall reflect the diversity of the residents of this
state with regard to race, ethnicity, gender, language, and geographic residence and to the extent
practicable the appointing authorities shall consult with organizations devoted to protecting the
voting rights of minority and other voters concerning potential appointees to the [IRC].”).
Glenn D. Magpantay, So Much Huff and Puff: Whether Independent Redistricting Commissions are
Inconsequential for Communities of Color, 16 UCLA ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 4, 6 (2011).
Melissa L. Saunders, Of Minority Representation, Multiple-Race Responses, and Melting Pots: Redistricting in
the New America, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1367, 1369–70 (2001).
C. Daniel Chill, Political Gerrymandering: Was Elbridge Gerry Right?, 33 TOURO. L. REV. 795, 796
(2017).
See infra Appendix.
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gone.” In examining vote dilution protections at the state level, it is clear
that many states are largely unprepared to be without Section 2’s minority
voter protections in the redistricting context. Forty-one states are in
Categories A, B, and C172—meaning that nearly every jurisdiction in the
United States relies solely on Section 2 to protect minority communities from
vote dilution. This is unacceptable.
Luckily, many states offer roadmaps for how to protect minority voters.
Some require dusting off unused language in a state’s constitutional or
statutory language, and others call upon the political grit that accompanies
legislative action. All voters should have the opportunity to participate in fair
elections and be able to elect the candidate of their choice in those fair
elections. But even more fundamental—a voter’s ability to challenge unfair
districting schemes should not hinge on a shift in one courthouse’s bench.

172

See infra Appendix.

Category

A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A

State

Ala.

Ark.

Conn.

Del.

Ga.

Haw.

Ind.

Kan.

Ky.

La.

Mass.

Me.

Redistricting
Authority
Citation (1)
Ala. Const. art.
IX,
§§ 198-200
Ark. Const. art.
8, §§ 2-3
Conn. Const.
art. III §§ 3-4
Del. Code
tit. 29 § 804
Ga. Const. art.
III, § II,
¶2
Haw. Const.
art. IV, § 6
Ind. Const. art.
4, § 5
Kan. Const.
art. 10, § 1
Ky. Const.
§ 33
La. Const. art.
III, § 6
Mass. Const.
amend. art. CI
Me. Const. art.
IV, pt. 1,
§2
Mass. Const.
art. CIX
Me. Const. art.
IV, pt. 2,
§2

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Redistricting
Authority
Citation (2)

N

N

N

N

N

N

N

N

N

N

N

N

VRA
Language
Statute

N

N

N

N

N

N

N

N

N

N

N

N

Additional
Protection
Statute

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Additional
Protection
Language

GOING, GUTTED, GONE

N

N

N

N

N

N

N

N

N

N

N

N

Commands
VRA
Compliance
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Redistricting Redistricting Commands
VRA
Additional Additional
State Category
Authority
Authority
VRA
Language Protection Protection
Citation (1)
Citation (2) Compliance
Statute
Statute
Language
Minn. Const.
Minn.
A
N/A
N
N
N
N/A
art. IV, §§ 2-3
Miss. Code
Miss. Const.
Miss.
A
N
N
N
N/A
§ 5-3-101
art. 13, § 254
N.C. Const.
N.C
A
N/A
N
N
N
N/A
art. II, §§ 3, 5
N.D. Cent.
N.D. Const.
N.D.
A
Code
N
N
N
N/A
art. IV, § 2
§ 54-03-01.5
N.H. Const.,
N.H
A
pt. 2, arts. 9,
N/A
N
N
N
N/A
11, 26
N.J. Const.
N.J.
A
N/A
N
N
N
N/A
art. IV, § 2
Neb. Const.
Neb.
A
N/A
N
N
N
N/A
art. III, § 5
Nev. Const.
Nev.
A
N/A
N
N
N
N/A
art. 4, § 5
Ohio Const.
Ohio
A
art. XI, §§ 3,
N/A
N
N
N
N/A
6-7
Penn. Const.
Penn.
A
N/A
N
N
N
N/A
art. II, § 16
R.I. Const. art.
R.I.
A
VII, § 1; art.
N/A
N
N
N
N/A
VIII, § 1
S.C. Code
S.C.
A
Ann. §§ 2-1-35,
N/A
N
N
N
N/A
70
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N/A
Idaho Code §
72-1506
Mich. Comp.
Laws § 4.261
Mont. Code
Ann.
§ 5-1-115

Alaska Const.
art. VI, § 6
Idaho Const.
art. III, § 5
Mich. Const.
art. IV,
§ 6(13)
Mont. Const.
art. V, § 14

B
B

B

B

Alaska

Idaho

Mich.

Mont.

Wy.

W.V.

Vt.

Va.

Tex.

State

Redistricting Redistricting
Category
Authority
Authority
Citation (1)
Citation (2)
Tex. Const.
A
art. III,
N/A
§§ 25-26
Va. Const.
Va. Code
A
art. II, § 6
§ 24.2-305(A)
Vt. Stat. tit. 17,
Vt. Const. Ch.
A
ch. 34A,
II, §§ 13, 18
§ 1903
W. Va. Const.,
A
N/A
art. VI, §§ 4, 6
Wyo. Const.
A
N/A
art. 3, §§ 3, 49
N
N
N

N
N
N/A

N

N

N

N

N

N

N

N

N

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

GOING, GUTTED, GONE

N

N

N

N

N

N

Alaska Stat.
§
15.10.300(d)(2)
Idaho Code
§ 72-1506(3)
Mich. Const.
art. IV, §
6(13)(a); Mich.
Comp. Laws §
4.261(a)
Mont. Code
Ann.
§ 5-1-115(2)

N

VRA
Additional Additional
Language Protection Protection
Statute
Statute
Language

N

Commands
VRA
Compliance
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Wis.

B

Wis. Const.,
art. IV,
§§ 4-5
N/A

N

N

Wis. Stat. §
5.081

Redistricting Redistricting Commands
VRA
Additional
State Category
Authority
Authority
VRA
Language Protection
Citation (1)
Citation (2) Compliance
Statute
Statute
S.D. Codified S.D. Certified
S.D. Const.
S.D.
B
Laws
Laws
N
N
art. III, § 5
§ 2-2-41
§ 2-2-41
Tenn. Code
Tenn. Code
Tenn. Const.
Tenn.
B
Ann. §§ 3-1Ann. § 3-1N
N
art. II, §§ 5-6
102, 103
103(b)
Utah Code
Utah Code
Utah
B
N/A
§ 20A-20N
N
§ 20A-20-201
302(4)(A)(v)
The State
creates an
avenue for
citizens to
file a
petition with
the State's
Attorney
General
alleging
failure to
comply with
Section 2.
The AG
then has
discretionary
authority to
commence
legal action
in any
relevant
court.

N/A

N/A

N/A

Additional
Protection
Language
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N/A

N/A
N/A

Colo. Const.
art. V, § 48.1
N.M. Stat.
Ann. §§ 2-7C3, 2-8D-2
Okla. Const.
art. 5, § 9A

C

C
C

Colo.

N.M.

Okla.

N/A

C

Redistricting
Authority
Citation (2)

Ariz.

Redistricting
Authority
Citation (1)
Ariz. Const.
art. IV, pt. 2, §
1(14)

Category

State

N

N

Colo. Const.
art. V,
§ 48.1(1)(b)

Commands
VRA
Compliance
Ariz. Const.
art. IV, pt. 2,
§ 1(14)(A)

VRA
Language
Statute
Ariz.
Const. art.
XX, ¶ 7
Colo.
Const.
art. V, §
48.1(4)(b)
N.M.
Const. art.
XXI, § 5
Okla.
Const.
art. I, § 6
N

N

N

N

Additional
Protection
Statute

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Additional
Protection
Language
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Cal. Const.
art. XXI,
§ 2(d)(1)-(2)

Cal. Gov't
Code tit. 2, ch.
3.2, §§ 82518253.6

N/A

Cal. Const. art.
XXI,
§ 2(d)

Fla. Const. art.
III,
§§ 16(a), 21

D

D

Cal.

Fla.

Fla. Const.
art. III,
§ 21(b)

Commands
VRA
Compliance

Redistricting
Authority
Citation (2)

Redistricting
Authority
Citation (1)

State Category

Fla. Stat. §
104.0515(4)

Cal. Elec.
Code
§ 14028(a)

VRA
Language
Statute

Fla. Const.
art. III,
§ 21(a)

Cal. Elec.
Code
§ 14027

Additional
Protection
Statute

Additional
Protection
Language
“An at-large method
of election may not be
imposed or applied in
a manner that impairs
the ability of a
protected class to elect
candidates of its
choice or its ability to
influence the outcome
of an election, as a
result of the dilution
or the abridgment of
the rights of voters
who are members of a
protected class.”
“[D]istricts shall not
be drawn with the
intent or result of
denying or abridging
the equal opportunity
of racial or language
minorities to
participate in the
political process or to
diminish their ability
to elect
representatives of
their choice.”
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N/A

Md. Const. art.
III, § 4

D

Md.

N

N

Md. Code
Ann. Elec.
Law § 16201(7)

Iowa Code §
42.4(5)

10 Ill.
Comp. Stat.
§ 120/5-5(a)

Additional
Protection
Statute

Additional
Protection
Language
“In any redistricting
plan ...
Representative
Districts shall be
drawn ... to create
crossover districts,
coalition districts, or
influence districts.”
“No district shall be
drawn for the purpose
of favoring a political
party, incumbent
legislator or member
of Congress, or other
person or group, or
for the purpose of
augmenting or
diluting the voting
strength of a language
or racial minority
group.”
“A person may not
willfully and
knowingly . . . engage
in conduct that results
or has the intent to
result in the denial or
abridgement of the
right of any citizen of
the United States to
vote on account of
race, color, or
disability.”
GOING, GUTTED, GONE

N

N

Iowa Const. art.
III, § 37

Iowa Code
§ 42.4

D

Iowa

N

10 Ill. Comp.
Stat. § 120/55(d)

N/A

Ill. Const. art.
IV, § 3

VRA
Language
Statute

Commands
VRA
Compliance

D

Redistricting
Authority
Citation (2)

Redistricting
Authority
Citation (1)

Ill.

State Category
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Redistricting
Authority
Citation (2)

N/A

N/A

Redistricting
Authority
Citation (1)

Mo. Const. art.
III, § 3

N.Y. Const.
art. III,
§§ 4-5

Category

D

D

State

Mo.

N.Y.

N

N

Mo. Const.
art. III,
§ 3(c)(1)(b)

N.Y. Const.
art. III,
§ 4(c)

Mo. Const.
art. III,
§ 3(c)(1)(b)

Additional
Protection
Statute
”Notwithstanding any
other provision of this
Article, districts shall not
be drawn with the intent
or result of denying or
abridging the equal
opportunity of racial or
language minorities to
participate in the political
process or diminishing
their ability to elect
representatives of their
choice, whether by
themselves or by voting in
concert with other
persons.”
“When drawing district
lines, the commission shall
consider whether such
lines would result in the
denial or abridgement of
racial or language
minority voting rights, and
districts shall not be drawn
to have the purpose of, nor
shall they result in, the
denial or abridgement of
such rights.”

Additional Protection
Language
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N.Y. Const.
art. III,
§ 4(c)

VRA
Language
Statute

Commands
VRA
Compliance
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N

N

Or. Rev. Stat.
§ 188.010

Wash. Rev.
Code §
44.05.090

Or. Const. art.
IV, § 7

Wash. Const.
art. II, § 43

D

D

Or.

Wash.

Commands
VRA
Compliance

Redistricting
Authority
Citation (2)

Redistricting
Authority
Citation (1)

Category

State

Or. Rev.
Stat. §
188.010(3)

Wash. Rev.
Code §
29A.92.030(
1)

Wash. Rev.
Code §§
29A.92.010
(3), (5);
29a.92.020

Additional
Protection
Statute

N

VRA
Language
Statute

“No district shall be
drawn for the purpose of
diluting the voting
strength of any language
or ethnic minority
group.”
“A political subdivision
is in violation ... when it
is shown that:
(a) Elections in the
political subdivision
exhibit polarized voting;
and (b) Members of a
protected class or classes
do not have an equal
opportunity to elect
candidates of their
choice as a result of the
dilution or abridgment
of the rights of members
of that protected class or
classes.”

Additional
Protection Language
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